U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations Concept: Something for NATO to Consider?

By

CDR (USN) Keith Turner

CDR (FRA-N) Antoine Frenais de Coutard

CDR (USN) Walter Buitrago

The guided-missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea launches a Standard Missile-2 during a training exercise in the Atlantic Ocean. Courtesy of USN. Photo by SN J. Bailey.

Introduction

This article will provide an overview of the U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept, the present and emerging threats of contested maritime zones from peer competitors, and the advantages of, and challenges to, NATO developing its own doctrinal DMO concept.

DMO is a U.S. Navy concept drafted in 2019 in response to the increasing development of advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems in numerous geographic areas around the globe.

Naval strategy has consistently used distribution as a tactical tool since the year 1600, focusing on how fleets are spread across areas to gain an advantage over adversaries. The basic tactic of distribution in naval warfare is to deploy forces across broad geographic areas, which compels enemies to divide their own forces, limiting their ability to concentrate on one target.

Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are rapidly advancing their A2/AD capabilities by integrating emerging technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), space assets, hypersonic missiles, and enhanced networking to create more resilient and effective defence systems. These developments aim to counteract traditional military strategies that focus on rapid, precision strikes against critical nodes, thereby necessitating a re-evaluation of offensive approaches.

Consequently, the United States and its NATO Allies may face prolonged and costly attrition campaigns when engaging within these fortified zones. Given the continued expansion of A2/AD systems, it is time for NATO to consider developing its own DMO concept to enhance interoperability with the U.S. Navy and increase its warfighting flexibility.

Julian Corbett and a History of DMO Since 1600

Julian Corbett’s Principles of Maritime Strategy outlines the critical role of distribution in naval strategy, emphasizing the need to deploy forces across broad areas to achieve control of sea lanes and maintain flexibility.

From the 1600s, naval powers like Britain, Spain, and the Dutch Republic used distributed fleets to protect trade routes and colonies while preventing enemies from concentrating forces. Corbett argues that distributing forces across strategic locations allows for local superiority and disrupts the enemy’s plans. During the Anglo-Dutch Wars, for example, Britain’s distributed fleets denied Spain and France dominance in key maritime regions while keeping forces mobile for rapid concentration when needed.

In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the British Navy applied these same principles during the Napoleonic Wars. Commanders like Nelson spread their fleets across the Mediterranean and the Caribbean, preventing French forces from gaining control of crucial maritime territories. At the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), Nelson’s distributed strategy allowed him to decisively engage the enemy despite being outnumbered, breaking their lines through strategic concentration.

With the advent of steam power in the 19th century, fleets became more mobile, and nations like Britain forward-deployed ships to critical locations, allowing for rapid redeployment. Corbett highlighted the importance of maintaining maritime communications while distributing assets globally, as seen during the Crimean War (1853–1856), when Britain moved forces across theatres to secure its interests.

In the 20th century, Corbett’s principles continued to apply. During both World Wars, distributed fleets in the Atlantic and Pacific allowed for strategic concentration, as seen with the U.S. Navy’s carriers in World War II. Corbett’s emphasis on distribution remains central to modern naval operations, balancing flexibility with the need for decisive engagement.

Through Corbett’s lens, the history of maritime distribution since 1600 is a history of evolving tactical and operational flexibility. Naval forces have always had to balance the need for distributed deployments to control key sea lanes, protect global communications, and deter potential threats, with the ability to concentrate forces for decisive engagements when the opportunity arises. Over time, the technology and methods for achieving these objectives have changed, but the core principle of distribution—positioning forces across wide areas to achieve localized superiority and global reach—has remained a central tenet of maritime strategy.

DMO Defined

There is no official unclassified description of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) so far. However, many available sources can help us define DMO and explore its implications for NATO maritime forces seeking to keep pace with emerging U.S. Navy concepts.

The U.S. Navy’s 2024 Navigation Plan (CNO NAVPLAN 24) emphasizes DMO as a central operational concept for modern naval strategy:

“Distributed Maritime Operations means dispersing the fleet while concentrating effects. The approach demands distributing, integrating, and manoeuvring people, platforms, munitions, and data across time, spectrum, and space.”

DMO aims to enhance the Navy’s ability to conduct operations in a more dispersed and flexible manner across vast maritime regions. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) are considered a joint contribution to the naval campaign. The EABO concept, developed by the U.S. Marine Corps, uses land-based assets to create A2/AD bubbles in maritime areas. This approach helps overcome adversaries’ advanced A2/AD capabilities and maintains operational advantage in contested environments.

At its core, DMO involves distributing naval forces across wide areas, leveraging the mobility and flexibility of platforms like surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. These forces operate in a coordinated, dynamic manner, making it difficult for adversaries to predict or concentrate their attacks. The goal is to create multiple “distributed sensors and shooters” that can operate independently but converge for concentrated effects when needed, enabling agility in response to rapidly changing situations.

In practice, DMO relies on advanced communication networks and sensor technologies to ensure integration and coordination among dispersed forces. The Navy’s use of unmanned systems, enhanced by AI and machine learning, is crucial for providing real-time situational awareness and extending operational reach. By distributing forces, the Navy can also leverage “offensive defense,” striking from multiple locations to complicate enemy targeting and increase survivability.

DMO also supports the Navy’s emphasis on partnerships and coalition operations, enabling Allied forces to integrate into a broader network of distributed assets. This interconnected approach enhances deterrence by demonstrating the Navy’s ability to rapidly adapt and respond across a broad spectrum of potential conflicts, from high-intensity warfare to competition in peacetime.

Russian Maritime Doctrine

Russia’s most recent maritime doctrine, released in July 2022, outlines the strategic priorities and goals for the country’s naval forces over the coming decades. The document emphasizes the Navy’s role in securing national interests amid growing geopolitical tensions. A core theme is enhancing Russia’s naval capabilities to protect maritime borders, defend economic zones, and project power—particularly in the Arctic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific. The doctrine underscores Russia’s aim to maintain control over key maritime chokepoints, including the Sea of Azov and the Mediterranean, while expanding influence in the Arctic.

To secure these chokepoints, Russia plans to develop and maintain advanced nuclear and conventional capabilities, including long-range cruise missiles and anti-ship systems, to counter the superiority of Western naval forces. A key element is the concept of asymmetric warfare, where small, agile, and technologically advanced vessels—such as corvettes and missile boats—are leveraged to disrupt larger, more traditional fleets.

The doctrine also stresses increasing Russia’s naval presence in global waters, particularly in regions where it seeks to challenge U.S. and NATO influence. Russia’s naval modernization is part of broader efforts to restore its status as a global maritime power capable of safeguarding its interests and challenging Western dominance in strategic areas.

The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad hosts significant A2/AD capabilities. Courtesy of the Atlantic Council.

Anti-Access / Area Denial

Russia’s maritime A2/AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) concept is a central aspect of its naval strategy, designed to prevent adversaries from operating freely in contested maritime regions, particularly along its borders. The objective is to make it difficult—or prohibitively costly—for foreign naval forces, especially NATO, to enter or operate within Russia’s strategic maritime zones.

The A2/AD concept integrates advanced missile systems, submarines, surface ships, and layered defence systems. It relies on long-range, highly accurate anti-ship missiles, air defence systems, and electronic warfare capabilities to deny adversaries freedom of movement. Key systems include anti-ship missiles such as the SS-N-26 Strobile, SS-N-33 Zircon, and SS-N-25 Switchblade, alongside SA-21 Growler air defence systems, which target naval vessels and aircraft at extended ranges.

Nuclear-powered submarines form another critical layer, equipped with Kalibr family cruise missiles capable of striking from long distances, thereby increasing deterrence and complicating enemy operations. Additionally, land-based anti-ship systems, such as the Bastion, and coastal defence forces in strategic areas like the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, reinforce Russia’s multi-layered A2/AD posture. The overarching aim is to significantly constrain adversary force projection within Russian-controlled or contested maritime zones.

DMO Application to the European Theatre

DMO can be a critical strategy for countering Russia’s A2/AD capabilities. According to the United States CNO NAVPLAN 24, the three key pillars of DMO are distribute, integrate, and manoeuvre. These pillars work together to enhance U.S. Navy and NATO forces’ ability to overcome Russian A2/AD defences and continue to access contested areas by controlling critical chokepoints and maintaining sea lines of communication (SLOC).23

Distribute

The first pillar, distribute, involves spreading naval forces across a broad operational area, rather than concentrating them in traditional carrier strike group formations. Russia’s A2/AD systems, which include long-range missile batteries, air defence systems like the SA-21, and submarines, are designed to target large, concentrated naval forces. By dispersing naval assets—such as surface ships, submarines, and aircraft—across vast areas, NATO can complicate Russia’s targeting efforts. Smaller, agile units operating in decentralized configurations make it more difficult for Russian forces to focus their A2/AD systems on a single target or formation. In practice, this could mean U.S. and NATO forces operating in smaller task groups spread across the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, or even the Arctic, making the force less predictable and harder to strike.24

U.S. Marines conduct a fire mission with a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System during an Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations exercise on Okinawa, June 2020. Courtesy of USMC. Photo by Cpl. D. Massieperez.

Integrate

The second pillar, integrate, focuses on creating a networked, interoperable force where U.S. and NATO assets—both manned and unmanned—are connected. This integration involves sharing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data in real time across a variety of platforms. This could include linking satellite sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surface ships, and submarines into a unified operational picture. Enhanced situational awareness allows NATO forces to identify Russian A2/AD systems and platforms, including missile launchers, radar sites, or surface combatants, and target them before they can engage friendly units. Early strikes to neutralize these defenses enable NATO aircraft and ships to operate with greater freedom.²⁵

Manoeuvre

The third pillar, manoeuvre, focuses on the ability to move forces into the most advantageous positions to concentrate strikes and rapidly reposition to adapt to evolving threats. Given the nature of Russian A2/AD, which aims to deny access to key chokepoints and strategic areas, the ability to manoeuvre is critical. DMO enables NATO forces to reposition flexibly, exploiting weaknesses in Russia’s defences. For example, submarines can be shifted to target key Russian naval or air defence assets, while surface combatants may operate in lower-threat areas to conduct missions without detection.

The ability to manoeuvre ensures NATO forces are not static targets and can continuously adapt to the operational environment. CNO NAVPLAN 24 emphasizes the need to manoeuvre across both time and space spectrums, relaying data to communicate and engage different threats effectively.²⁶

In the European theatre, DMO provides NATO with a powerful strategy to counter Russian threats. Distribution complicates Russia’s targeting by spreading forces across multiple regions. Integration maintains a shared, real-time operational picture, allowing for coordinated strikes on Russian assets. Manoeuvre ensures agility, enabling forces to exploit gaps or weaknesses in Russian defences. Together, these pillars—distribute, integrate, and manoeuvre—enhance NATO’s flexibility and survivability, maintaining freedom of movement in key European maritime regions despite Russia’s A2/AD capabilities.

Does NATO Need DMO?

Based on the above discussion, implementing DMO within NATO is crucial—not only to prepare for potential conflicts in SACEUR’s area of responsibility (AOR) but also for European NATO navies to maintain interoperability with each other and with the U.S. Navy across any operational context. Distribution shifts the posture from carrier-centric operations to a more fleet- and theatre-wide approach, representing a paradigm shift. NATO tactics, traditionally focused on power projection and defence in depth, would incorporate a new concept of offensive and defensive distributed force to ensure sea control in contested environments. While this may appear to conflict with traditional principles of joint operations, such as mass, economy of force, and concentration of effort, DMO leverages concentrated fire, long-range anti-surface strikes, and unmanned systems, keeping other forces at reduced risk. Importantly, DMO does not replace carrier strike group operations but expands the range of operational options for future crises.

DMO has informed U.S. Navy doctrine development for over five years and is now a key training objective across wargames up to the Fleet level. It continues to shape the Navy’s mindset from staff to tactical units and large-scale exercises. Implementation is ongoing on both coasts, and U.S. tactical publications remain roughly aligned with NATO doctrine, given the Navy’s role as custodian for much of it. The DMO concept will increasingly influence U.S. tactics and is expected to enter NATO tactical publications in the near future.

In a future Pacific crisis, European NATO navies may face reduced U.S. Navy support within a single scenario in SACEUR’s AOR. Whether using DMO or traditional naval warfare concepts, European navies would bear greater responsibility in the maritime domain—a consequence not of DMO itself, but of geopolitical realities that prompted its development. Aligning standards, concepts, and procedures would enhance integration of U.S. naval assets into NATO forces. Moreover, DMO implementation would facilitate the integration of European assets into potential Pacific theatre operations under an Article V scenario.²⁷²⁸²⁹

An F-35C Lightning II prepares to launch from the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the Pacific, February 2025. Courtesy of USN. Photo by MCS 3rd Class N. Jordan.

Does DMO Complement Multi-Domain Operations?

While the U.S. Navy develops DMO, NATO is pursuing the concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). Acknowledging that MDO must be seen from a more strategic and operational standpoint than DMO, the principles of MDO—including the Cross Domain Command Concept (CDCC) and the digital backbone—could be closely related, if not overlapping, with DMO trends.

As a vital consequence, the digital backbone standards developed by NATO and the upcoming U.S. Navy Operational Architecture (NOA) should be interoperable. Based on networks, infrastructure, data, tools, and analytics, the NOA should be designed to extend to joint and coalition forces. Additionally, the updated NATO Maritime C2 structure, and its potential adjustments as a consequence of the MDO concept, should be interoperable with U.S. Navy efforts.

U.S. Marines offload an MV-22 Osprey during an Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations exercise on Okinawa, June 2020. Courtesy of USMC. Photo by Cpl. D. Massieperez.

Is This Goal Reachable?

To put readers’ minds at ease, one can explore the current trends.

Firstly, North American and European NATO navies have worked together for decades, and the level of integration between all navies is excellent—especially compared with our adversaries. Maintaining this interoperability, however, is never-ending work.

Secondly, if not explicitly called DMO, distribution is a well-known concept, as depicted above and more recently in French tactical studies.³⁰ Recent experiences in the Red Sea emphasized the distribution of forces to secure chokepoints, the importance of point defence over layered defence, the challenges of weapons logistics management, and the necessity to develop support facilities or conduct at-sea replenishment. Distributed war at sea is not only a historical and future concept—it is clearly a current one. However, the scale should be considered to inform the employment of carrier and amphibious task groups.

Focusing on SACEUR’s AOR, the combination of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and national task groups could be compared to the distributed fleet depicted in the DMO concept. While the Pacific theatre emphasizes mass to counter extensive A2/AD and numerous PRC naval units, NATO’s assets face a more balanced comparison against Russian forces. Exercise Steadfast Defender 2024 also demonstrated NATO naval forces’ ability to operate within a new C2 and more cross-domain environment.

Achieving DMO within NATO requires prioritizing logistics, which presents its own challenges. To maintain Alliance maritime capabilities—regarding both interoperability and weapons stockpiles—the unmanned fleet and medium-sized supply and amphibious fleet developed by the U.S. Navy should inform European navies’ acquisition plans. Thus, within the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), options for at-sea replenishment must be agile and multifunctional, supporting force sustainment and persistent ISR requirements.³¹

As interoperability is never-ending work, NATO navies must maintain the pace of adaptation to the new operational context. New wargaming and simulation tools are key to training crews and staffs to operate jointly and to refine a potential NATO DMO concept. As the U.S. Navy developed Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training via Fleet Synthetic Training (FST), NATO is developing the Distributed Synthetic Training Project, natively joint and, in the future, multi-domain. Based on national facilities and tools, its naval component³² has proven effective in delivering training up to the carrier strike group level.³³ While LVC will never replace sea trials and major exercises, it can enhance naval tactics implementation. Therefore, major exercises should be leveraged to inform or test new counter-A2/AD concepts, with distribution as a key component.

The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Annapolis transits Apra Harbor, Naval Base Guam, December 2024. Courtesy of USN. Photo by Lt. J. Caliva.

Conclusion

This analysis has underscored the critical importance of the U.S. Navy’s DMO concept and its implications for NATO. As peer competitors such as Russia and the PRC advance their A2/AD capabilities, the traditional concentration of naval power becomes increasingly vulnerable. DMO, with its emphasis on distribution, integration, and manoeuvre, offers a tactical and operational response to these challenges, enabling naval forces to maintain flexibility and effectiveness in contested maritime environments.

The examination of Russia’s maritime doctrine and A2/AD strategies highlights the urgent need for NATO to consider developing a DMO concept. By dispersing forces, integrating assets, and maintaining manoeuvrability, the Alliance can enhance its ability to control critical chokepoints and sea lines of communication in the European theatre.

Furthermore, interoperability between the U.S. Navy and NATO navies is crucial. The adoption of a NATO-specific DMO doctrine would not only enhance operational effectiveness but also improve integration in joint operations. While challenges remain—particularly in aligning DMO with NATO’s MDO concept and ensuring interoperable digital backbones—the existing level of cooperation and ongoing development of advanced training tools, such as LVC simulations, provide a solid foundation.

NATO should recognize and consider the implications of DMO in its next iteration of maritime strategy. Ultimately, developing and implementing a NATO DMO concept is not merely a tactical adjustment but an operational imperative. It is essential for maintaining maritime superiority, deterring aggression, and ensuring the continued security and stability of the Alliance in an increasingly contested global maritime landscape. Continuous adaptation, training, and technological advancement remain paramount to ensure NATO’s naval forces can operate effectively within the evolving security environment.

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Endnotes

1. U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2024 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2024), https://www.navy.mil/leadership/chief-of-naval-operations/cno-navplan-2024/.

2. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), 87, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm.

3. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 99.

4. Douglas C. Douds and Kyle J. Barlow, “The Challenge of Dis-Integrating an A2/AD Zone: How Emerging Technologies Are Shifting the Operational Environment,” National Defense University Press, March 4, 2020, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2106488/the-challenge-of-dis-integrating-a2ad-zone-how-emerging-technologies-are-shifti/.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 87.

8. Ibid., 99.

9. Ibid., 132.

10. Ibid., 139.

11. Ibid., 155.

12. Ibid., 182.

13. Ibid., 210.

14. U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2024 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2024), 14, https://www.navy.mil/Portals/1/CNO/NAVPLAN2024/Files/CNO-NAVPLAN-2024-high-res-v2.pdf.

15. Ibid., 14.

16. Ibid., 15.

17. Ibid., 15.

18. Ibid., 15.

19. Chatham House, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic,” June 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/russias-military-posture-arctic/2-perimeter-control-around-bastion.

20. High North News, “Control Over Arctic Ocean Top Priority in New Russian Naval Doctrine,” January 2021, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/control-over-arctic-ocean-top-priority-new-russian-naval-doctrine.

21. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “NATO Ready for War,” 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-ready-war.

22. Chatham House, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic,” June 2019.

23. United States Navy, “CNO NAVPLAN 2024,” 2024, https://www.navy.mil/navplan2024.

24. CSIS, “NATO Ready for War.”

25. High North News, “Control Over Arctic Ocean Top Priority in New Russian Naval Doctrine.”

26. United States Navy, “CNO NAVPLAN 2024.”

27. See Joint Publication series and Foch, Ferdinand: Des principes de la guerre, 1903.

28. Notably NATO Allied Joint Publications 3 series.

29. Notably GBR, ITA, FRA, GER, NLD who deploy in the Pacific on a regular basis.

30. CAPT Lavernhe and CDR Corman, Vaincre en mer au XXIe siècle (Paris: Éditions des Équateurs, 2023), Chapters 4 and 5.

31. Pending development on TF 69 and TF X in the Baltic Sea.

32. Live Virtual Constructive Training in the maritime domain, led by NATO Maritime Command.

33. Dynamic Mirage 25 exercise.