The Importance of Space in The Maritime Domain

By

CDR (USN) Michael Ordonez

CDR (USN) Ehab Makhlouf

INTRODUCTION

This article examines how the maritime domain has historically relied on space for navigational information, and how that reliance has not only increased, but also expanded with the invention and modernization of space systems. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), missile warning, and satellite communications (SATCOM) are four space support areas that have improved thanks to present-day space systems. However, if modern navies want to keep pace with continuously evolving space systems, then they must examine the challenges and limitations in applying space capabilities to the maritime domain, and seek opportunities to develop space expertise, processes, and tactics.

Throughout history, sailors have used their understanding of space to navigate the world’s oceans and expand the boundaries of human exploration. Mariners’ historic use of space reflects humanity’s ingenuity and adaptability to overcome the challenges of ocean navigation. From reliance on stars and natural indicators to the precise satellite-based systems of today, seafarers expanded their mastery of celestial knowledge. This evolution underscores the connection between the sea and space domains, and highlights space’s enduring importance to human progress.

In the 20th and 21st centuries, the advent of satellite technology fundamentally altered maritime navigation. Further advances in this technology, coupled with a progressively interconnected world, increased the importance of the space domain, particularly in areas reliant on rapidly acquired information like the global economy and national security and defence.¹ “...Using space to obtain an information advantage is a key aspect of joint operations,” said retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Brian Brown.² Considering over 70 percent of the Earth’s surface is covered by oceans and waterways,³ the maritime domain is one that benefits greatly from the data gathered using modern space systems. That data and the information gleaned from it are crucial to multiple naval mission areas, none more so than MDA.

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

MDA refers to the understanding and knowledge of all activities occurring in the maritime domain that could impact a nation’s security, safety, economy, or environment. This concept is essential for both securing sea lanes, protecting maritime infrastructure, enhancing geopolitical stability, and fostering international cooperation. Given the global reliance on sea-based transportation and commerce,⁴ MDA is crucial for safeguarding maritime borders and ensuring that both lawful and illicit activities are identified and appropriately managed. Space-based technology has increased the capabilities used in MDA, therefore improving international maritime security.⁵

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines MDA as “...the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy or the marine environment.”⁶ The United States’s National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan adopts the IMO’s definition⁷ while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses the terminology “Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA).”⁸ Despite some differences, both definitions highlight the importance of understanding actors and activities occurring in the maritime domain, which makes MDA fertile ground for applying modern space technology.⁹

Stakeholders within the maritime domain relied on radio frequency and space-based technologies for decades,¹⁰ making those systems essential, but also targets for adversaries. One example is the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a transponder-based system mandated by the IMO that transmits and receives real-time unclassified navigational information.¹¹ AIS has been the technological baseline for maritime navigation and awareness. While the system was a start to achieving MDA, its vulnerabilities and limitations (e.g., spoofing, loose enforcement of use, and deceptive tactics by bad actors)¹² demand a more robust, multi-layered approach to today’s goals. The maritime community must seek and adopt new innovative methods that mitigate modern risks and improve maritime awareness.

A Falcon 9 rocket carrying the Starlink 12-16 mission lifts off from Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, in March 2025. This launch added another 23 satellites to the constellation of more than 7,000 currently in low Earth orbit. Courtesy of the U.S. Space Force. Photo by R. Mason.

In October 2023, NATO defence ministers introduced the Digital Ocean Vision, an Alliance-endorsed initiative aimed at enhancing MSA across sea and space.¹³ The Digital Ocean Enterprise is intended to cultivate national and Allied MDA synergies via their respective technologies including autonomous systems and satellites.¹⁴ This strategy is one focus area in NATO’s initiative to better harness modern technology. Shortly after endorsing the Digital Ocean Vision, leaders hosted over 200 representatives across governments and industry to discuss how industry could help NATO more effectively wield emerging and disruptive technology in order to increase detection capabilities and act on maritime information.¹⁵ Furthermore, NATO is using its own initiatives like the Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping with Maritime Unmanned Systems (REPMUS) event and Exercise DYNAMIC MESSENGER to serve as test beds for modern systems.¹⁶

The European Space Agency (ESA) also looks to space technology to assist maritime objectives through space-based surveillance.¹⁷ The ESA is developing next generation satellites with radar, AIS, and other imaging and sensing payloads to augment terrestrial capabilities.

This framework of European systems assists efforts ranging from countering illicit activities at sea (e.g., humans, drugs, weapons smuggling) to environmental and meteorological observations.¹⁸ The Sentinel satellites use synthetic aperture radar and thermal infra-red instruments to monitor ocean warming, sea levels, and coastal environments.¹⁹ The Copernicus Maritime Surveillance (CMS) Service is implemented by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to collect electro-optical satellite imagery in order to increase the understanding and monitoring of maritime safety, security, pollution, and international cooperation.²⁰

MDA has always been a focal point for achieving and maintaining maritime security,²¹ but how to effectively do so has significantly changed as technology has evolved, especially in space. Robust MDA relies on a wide array of capabilities across several domains, but government, military, and civilian mariners alike must stay informed on emerging space systems to ensure they are designed to meet, or at least consider, maritime security requirements. This includes Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) that are critical to MDA, but even more so to PNT.

POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING

PNT is a critical capability for modern mariners because it ensures that vessels can operate safely, navigate accurately, and respond to emerging maritime threats effectively, PNT systems, particularly the Global Positioning System (GPS), are integral to the global maritime industry.²² They are also crucial technology for military operations, telecommunications, and scientific research. These systems provide essential data to determine precise locations, guide movements, and synchronize timing for communication and computer networks. PNT technology has evolved significantly, driven by advances in satellite systems, ground-based infrastructure, and computational techniques.

There are several GNSS options, including the United States’s GPS, the European Galileo system, and the Russian “Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS),” which all provide positioning data by triangulating signals from multiple satellites.²³ These systems are widely used in the maritime domain where vessels rely on both satellite signals and Inertial Navigation Systems (INS).

Integrating GNSS with an INS significantly improves both navigational accuracy and resiliency, which is necessary in environments like city streets with tall buildings (“urban canyons”), or in tunnels where GNSS signals can be obstructed for extended periods.²⁴ Ongoing PNT research focuses on increasing resilience in navigation systems, such as integrating multiple GNSS constellations, enhancing signal encryption, and utilizing quantum-based positioning technology. These advancements aim to improve the robustness and reliability of PNT applications in an increasingly interconnected world.²⁵

Despite their advantageous capabilities, GNSS like GPS still face disruptive challenges like signal interference, multipath errors, and vulnerability to jamming and spoofing. GPS signals can be disrupted by electronic warfare, leading to security concerns for military and civilian applications.²⁶ One notable instance of GPS spoofing occurred in 2017, when it was reported that Russian operatives conducted GPS spoofing attacks near the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. These attacks caused GPS receivers in the area to report false positions, disrupting the navigation systems in several vehicles and degrading various commercial and military systems.

Another high-profile case was in 2018 when it was reported that Iran was involved in GPS spoofing attacks against drones operating in the Persian Gulf, tricking them into landing at incorrect locations.²⁷ GNSS is a critical technology that has revolutionized navigation and awareness in the maritime domain. Advances in the technology focus on increasing accuracy, reliability, and security. As GPS integrates with other navigation systems and technological innovations, it will remain a cornerstone not only for MDA and PNT operations, but also maritime missile warning and SATCOM.

MARITIME MISSILE WARNING

Early Warning Missile Defence Systems (EWMDS) are the first line of defence against ballistic missile threats. They provide NATO navies with crucial time to detect, track, and intercept incoming attacks. These systems evolved significantly after the Cold War by integrating advanced radar, satellite surveillance, and artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance response capabilities.

EWMDS rely on a combination of ground-based and space-based sensors to detect missile launches in their boost phase. The U.S. has stations at Fort Greely, Alaska, a major site for intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, which is equipped with ground-based interceptors. In Europe, there are an increasing number of stations charged with early warning defence as follows: Deveselu Air Base in Romania hosts a key NATO missile defence system as a part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA); Türkiye hosts radar installations in cooperation with NATO; and, Redzikowo, Poland is a future site for a U.S. Aegis Ashore missile defence system supporting NATO’s European missile defence efforts. These terrestrial sites, combined with satellite constellations like the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), enhance early detection capabilities.²⁸

NATO organizes Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (Aegis BMD) within its broader missile defence architecture to protect member nations from potential ballistic missile threats. These systems are part of NATO’s collective defence strategy and are integrated into the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) initiative.²⁹ Once a missile threat is detected, EWMDS coordinate with missile interception systems GMD and Aegis BMD. These systems use kinetic interceptors, like the Standard Missile-3 and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), to neutralize threats before they reach their targets. Modern defence strategies emphasize a layered approach, combining multiple interception methods to increase the likelihood of successful neutralization.³⁰

EWMDS deployments have significant geopolitical implications, and influence deterrence policies and military alliances. Nations like the U.S., Russia, and China invest in missile defence and shape global security dynamics through arms control agreements and regional defence collaborations.³¹ However, advances in hypersonic missile technology pose new challenges, necessitating continued innovations in detection and interception methods. In response to this and other threats, EWMDS developers are integrating AI to further improve data processing and threat differentiation, reducing false alarms and improving response efficiency.³² AI and other innovations will be necessary for EWMDS to keep pace with the technology advances occurring today.

EWMDS are critical to afloat air defence platforms, enabling rapid detection and interception of missile threats. With ongoing technological advances and evolving global security challenges, these systems must continually adapt to emerging threats. The integration of AI, advanced radar, and space-based surveillance ensures that EWMDS remain a cornerstone of modern defence strategy.

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

SATCOM is arguably the most critical space-based service for ships conducting maritime operations thanks to its enabling invaluable long-range and “over the horizon” communications at sea. While NATO navies have traditionally relied on a small constellation of large communications satellites in geostationary/geosynchronous orbit (GEO), the range of counterspace capabilities developed by several countries over the past decade threaten traditional SATCOM models. On the higher end of destructive capabilities, the U.S., Russia, China, and India have successfully tested direct ascent anti-satellite missiles.³³ On the lower end of the technological spectrum, jamming and/or spoofing signals or cyber-attacks are accessible options for both state and non-state actors.³⁴ These potential threats are forcing navies and other maritime actors to turn to newer satellite systems for more robust, multi-faceted SATCOM solutions critical to maritime operations.

One current tactic for hardening SATCOM is moving services to Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (PLEO) satellite constellations, a recent space paradigm shift in methodology that reduces the threat surface of traditional large GEO constellations by spreading coverage across hundreds or even thousands of smaller satellites. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is rapidly adopting PLEO satellite internet services; first with the commercial Starlink constellation, but with plans to eventually acquire Starshield satellites (which are Starlink satellites with additional security capabilities designed for military-use).³⁵ The U.S. Navy pilot programs adopting this technology for shipboard use are titled “Satellite Terminal (transportable) Non-Geostationary (STtNG)” and “Sailor Edge Afloat and Ashore (SEA2).”³⁶ Reportedly, two U.S. Navy ships are fitted with STtNG and SEA2 using Starshield/Starlink as SATCOM transports, with future plans to install it across the fleet.³⁷ According to programme office representatives, advantages include: a small footprint that allows swift integration onboard ships; persistent, secure, global access; and high speed, low latency bandwidth.³⁸ Most importantly, commercial PLEO capabilities add resilience through diversification in communications pathways, enabling the U.S. Navy’s objective to conduct distributed maritime operations and align with the DOD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control priorities.³⁹ Traditional military SATCOM, combined with the new commercial PLEO capabilities, provides U.S. ships with a more agile, “defence in depth” long-range communications framework to mitigate the risks presented by counterspace technologies.

NATO is likewise researching how best to adopt and adjust to the emergence of commercial PLEO SATCOM. In 2023, representatives from the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) attended Eutelsat’s and OneWeb’s demonstration of their combined PLEO and GEO multi-orbit capabilities.⁴⁰ The two European SATCOM companies partnered together to provide “secure, agile, resilient, and assured (SARA)” SATCOM to NATO as a solution for diversified and layered communications.⁴¹ Additionally, the NATO Science and Technology Office (STO) recently conducted a multi-year study on meshing both military and commercial SATCOM resources for the Alliance.⁴² The study analyzed current and future planned military and commercial networks, identified SATCOM gaps based on NATO requirements, and identified communications standards to be used by space stakeholders.⁴³ The latter objective is especially critical because NATO relies on several Allied countries for SATCOM services through memorandums of understanding.⁴⁴ Incorporating commercial PLEO SATCOM either via Allied countries or through NATO itself could complicate the standards needed to ensure allies can continue to communicate and operate with one another. To help set the standard, NATO plans to release an Alliance-focused commercial space strategy later this year.⁴⁵

According to Major General Devin Pepper, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy at Allied Command Transformation, the strategy will provide Alliance partners instructions on how to take advantage of commercial space technology for their own and NATO’s benefit.⁴⁶ Since not all countries have organic space capabilities,⁴⁷ it will be crucial to identify and define a common baseline for afloat commercial SATCOM systems between the different militaries to achieve interoperability across allied ships and the NATO enterprise.

Navies have long relied on SATCOM to conduct long-range communications, and with the upsurge in commercial PLEO satellite internet constellations, that capability is more accessible than ever. However, allied nations must consider the pros and cons of adopting new space systems, and their naval representatives must advocate for solutions that meet the unique challenges within the maritime domain.

The KSAT Svalbard Ground Station, with more than 160 antennas, is recognised as the world’s largest polar ground station. Courtesy of KSAT.

AREAS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT

Sailors and decision-makers from national navies and the wider maritime community must take an active role in maximizing the value of space capabilities for maritime operations. It is not enough to simply be users or customers. Greater attention must be given to the training, processes, and policies that govern the fusion of space and maritime domains to ensure the proper and effective use of emerging technologies.

Allied navies must also develop internal space expertise. It is insufficient to be experts solely in shipboard systems that interface with space assets. As Vice Admiral Brown notes, services require personnel who are familiar with both their native domain and the space domain to achieve genuine joint integration. Sailors who regularly interact with space systems—and thus understand both maritime and space tactics and operations—will be invaluable in communicating operational requirements to service providers who may not be familiar with the unique demands of maritime environments. Moreover, such personnel can contribute meaningfully to joint strategic and operational planning, helping design true multi-domain operations rather than maintaining traditional supported/supporting relationships.

Another area for improvement lies in resourcing and acquisition speed. Admirals White and Barrett argue that “the Navy acquisition process must adapt to generate these resources at speed and scale.” As commercial space technology evolves rapidly, national navies must act with similar agility. Failure to do so risks either missing the operational window of relevance for new technologies or being unable to employ them effectively. To remain competitive, naval acquisition processes must become more flexible, adaptable, and responsive—capable of integrating cutting-edge space systems before they are rendered obsolete.

Finally, NATO navies must continue to strengthen partnerships—both within the Alliance and with the commercial space industry. Beyond establishing technical standards for SATCOM, Allies can enhance integration through combined watch floors, cooperative exercises, and shared operational frameworks, cultivating a truly cohesive fighting force capable of operating seamlessly across multiple domains. Combining military expertise and manpower serves as a force multiplier across all warfare areas.

Equally important is maintaining a robust partnership with the private sector, ensuring Allied navies have the resources, technology, and innovation necessary to meet current and future maritime challenges. Navies can reduce both time and risk in adopting new technologies by leveraging the private sector’s efficiency in research, development, testing, and evaluation. These partnerships also help ensure ships are equipped with state-of-the-art systems and sufficient operational resources—such as bandwidth and trained operators—to employ them effectively at sea.

The strategic conflicts of the modern, globalized world cannot be addressed through isolated or national approaches. They demand a joint, cooperative effort across nations, alliances, and industry—an approach that unites innovation, expertise, and shared purpose to secure the maritime domain of the future.

CONCLUSION

The space domain has been intertwined with the maritime domain for as long as humankind has sailed the seas. Yet, the rapid evolution of space technology and capabilities over recent decades now demands that modern sailors evolve their own understanding of space and its applications. Beyond traditional maritime expertise, today’s sailors must deepen their knowledge of the space domain—particularly its effects on and interdependence with maritime operations.

This understanding is especially vital for operators involved in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), missile warning, and satellite communications (SATCOM). Allied navies cannot assume their distinct maritime requirements will automatically be reflected in the design or operation of space systems. Instead, they must take an active role: expanding awareness of space capabilities, analyzing how those capabilities affect and enhance maritime operations, and clearly communicating operational requirements to their respective space effects enterprises.

Space remains a critical force multiplier for NATO’s maritime operations—enabling global reach, resilience, and strategic advantage. As the space domain grows increasingly contested, the Alliance must continue to advance its space capabilities to ensure it maintains superiority at sea and preserves freedom of action across all domains.

---

ENDNOTES

1. Kari A. Bingen et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2024,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2024.

2. Brian Brown, “The Challenge of Joint Space Operations,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 150, no. 1 (January 2024): 1.

3. National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan, Revision 4, January 5, 2023.

4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, DC, 2005. Retrieved from internet March 25, 2025.

5. Dan Parsons, “Satellites Seen as Critical to Maritime Security,” National Defense, June 17, 2014. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2014/6/16/satellites-seen-as-critical-to-maritime-security-updated. Retrieved from internet March 26, 2025.

6. International Maritime Organization (IMO), “Maritime Domain Awareness,” https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Maritime-Domain-Awareness.aspx. Retrieved from internet January 27, 2025.

7. NMIO, National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan, D-2.

8. NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO), “Standards for Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA),” https://www.sto.nato.int/Lists/test1/activitydetails.aspx?ID=17519. Retrieved from internet January 27, 2025.

9. The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, Policies for Maritime Domain Awareness and Space Technology, October 2023.

10. Isabelle Duvaux-Bechon et al., “Space as an Enabler in the Maritime Sector,” Acta Astronautica 162 (September 2019): 2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2019.06.017.

11. Steven C. Boraz, “Maritime Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 147.

12. Ibid.

13. NATO, “NATO Defence Ministers Launch Initiative to Enhance Maritime Surveillance Capabilities,” October 12, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/news_219441.htm. Retrieved from internet January 27, 2025.

14. Ibid.

15. NATO, “NATO and Industry Work Together to Strengthen Maritime Surveillance,” April 17, 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_224798.htm. Retrieved from internet January 21, 2025.

16. Ibid.

17. Duvaux-Bechon et al., “Space as an Enabler,” 18–19.

18. European Space Agency, “Why Is Space Relevant for Maritime Issues?” https://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Copernicus/Why_is_space_relevant_for_maritime_issues. Retrieved from internet January 27, 2025.

19. Ibid.

20. European Maritime Safety Agency, “Copernicus Maritime Surveillance Service,” https://www.emsa.europa.eu/copernicus.html. Retrieved from internet January 27, 2025.

21. Boraz, “Maritime Domain Awareness,” 144.

22. John E. Smith, “The Role of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing in Maritime Domain Awareness,” Journal of Maritime Security and Navigation 34, no. 2 (2020): 45–58.

23. E. D. Kaplan and C. Hegarty, Understanding GPS: Principles and Applications, 2nd ed. (Artech House, 2006): 2.

24. Naser El-Sheimy and Zhiwei Li, “Integration of GNSS and Inertial Sensors for High-Accuracy Positioning in Challenging Environments,” Journal of Navigation 61, no. 3 (2008): 405–421.

25. G. Giorgi and F. R. J. P. van den Berg, “Challenges in Modern Navigation: Security Threats and Vulnerabilities in GNSS,” Journal of Navigation 75, no. 4 (2022): 655–674.

26. Wen Zhang and Guoqiang Li, “Vulnerabilities of GPS and Countermeasures Against Jamming and Spoofing,” Journal of Navigation 70, no. 3 (2017): 459–475.

27. Alan Cameron, “Russia Practices Widespread Spoofing,” GPS World, April 2, 2019. https://www.gpsworld.com/russia-practices-widespread-spoofing/. Retrieved from internet March 25, 2025.

28. Arms Control Association (ACA), “Missile Defense Systems at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, last reviewed August 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missile-defense-systems-glance. Retrieved from internet March 25, 2025.

29. NATO, “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD),” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120520_media-backgrounder_NATO_ballist.pdf. Retrieved from internet March 25, 2025.

30. ACA, “Missile Defense Systems at a Glance.”

31. K. Williams, “Geopolitical Consequences of Missile Defense Systems,” International Affairs Review 76, no. 4 (2021): 89–103.

32. U.S. Missile Defense Agency (USMDA), “Ballistic Missile Defense Overview.”

33. Bingen et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2024,” 4.

34. Ibid., 5.

35. Sandra Erwin, “Pentagon Embracing SpaceX’s Starshield for Future Military SATCOM,” SpaceNews, June 11, 2024. https://spacenews.com/pentagon-embracing-spacexs-starshield-for-future-military-satcom/. Retrieved from internet January 30, 2025.

36. Mark Pomerleau and Brandi Vincent, “Starlink Terminals Give Navy ‘Game-Changing’ Flexibility,” Defense Scoop, April 11, 2024. https://defensescoop.com/2024/04/11/starlink-terminals-navy-spacex-shipboard-c4i/. Retrieved from internet January 30, 2025.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Richard Thomas, “NATO Receives GEO and LEO Multi-Orbit SATCOM Demo,” Airforce Technology, June 8, 2023. https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/nato-geo-leo-satcom-demo/?cf-view. Retrieved from internet January 30, 2025.

41. Ibid.

42. NATO STO, “Hybrid Military and Commercial SATCOM Networks,” https://www.sto.nato.int/Lists/test1/activitydetails.aspx?ID=16938. Retrieved from internet January 21, 2025.

43. Ibid.

44. C. Todd Lopez, “Two New Nations Join Program to Provide SATCOM Support to NATO,” DOD News, June 27, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3819541/two-new-nations-join-program-to-provide-satcom-support-to-nato/. Retrieved from internet January 21, 2025.

45. Mikayla Easley, “NATO Looks to Publish First Commercial Space Strategy in 2025,” Defense Scoop, October 10, 2024. https://defensescoop.com/2024/10/10/nato-commercial-space-strategy-2025/. Retrieved from internet January 21, 2025.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Brown, “The Challenge of Joint Space Operations,” 7.

49. Ibid.

50. Danelle Barrett, Jake Bebber, and T. J. White, “The Navy Is Not Ready for the Information War of 2026,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 2024): 6.

51. Brown, “The Challenge of Joint Space Operations,” 8.

52. Mathias Katsuya, “‘The Province of All Mankind’? Space and Maritime Challenges in an Era of Strategic Disruption,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, The Clock Tower Security Series. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/clock-tower-security-series/province-all-mankind-space-and-maritime-challenges-era-strategic-disruption. Retrieved from internet January 13, 2025.